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  This paper looks at youth labour market trends concentrating on developing and 
transition countries. Questions relating to the integration of young people into decent work 
have in recent times once again begun to occupy a central position in Government Policy 
issues. Recently co-ordinated efforts also at the international level have begun to make 
themselves felt. In particular, on the initiative of Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, the 
Youth Employment Network (YEN) was established. This is a joint effort of the United 
nations, the World Bank and the ILO and has provided a focus for the work of these 
organisations on problems related to youth employment and unemployment. This paper aims 
to provide a contribution to debate on the issues by giving an overview of trends in the youth 
labour market, principally in Transition and developing countries. 
In this section, after giving an outline of the paper, some basic definitional issues are 
dealt with. In section two, the paper then looks at long-run trends in some broad aggregates 
relevant to youth labour markets. The section discusses long-run movements in population 
and population share, labour force and labour force participation, education and child labour. 




*The author Niall O’Higgins, professor, Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Salerno. E-mail 
address:  nohiggins@unisa.it prepared this paper for the Youth Employment Workshop, World Bank, 
Washington DC, June2, 2003.  I wish, above all, to acknowledge the enormous amount of labour embodied in 
the information presented in these pages, in particular, on the part of people working for national and 
international agencies responsible for the collection and compilation of the data employed here. This I have 
partaken of freely. For this work, and the opportunity to exploit it, I am most grateful. much of the analysis 
included here would not have been, indeed were not, possible even five years ago. I  wish also to thank 
participants at the World Bank seminar for useful comments. Any additional comments would of course be 
most welcome.   2
and whose outcomes are appropriate to examine as well as their determinants. The fourth, 
concluding section draws out some of the implications of the preceding analysis for policy, 
research and data collection purposes. 
Before embarking on the main discussion brief mention should be made of some 
underlying definitional issues. The paper fairly rigidly employs the standard UN definition of 
young people as those belonging to the 15-24 age-group, with the lower limit adjusting to 
accommodate variations in minimum school-leaving age. Undoubtedly socioeconomic, 
cultural and institutional contexts vary markedly across countries. The appropriate definition 
of what constitutes a young person (or a child or an adult) will consequently vary with them. 
There is no reason why countries, in formulating their youth employment policies, should 
adhere rigidly to such definitions. Indeed, they do not. However, for the purposes of looking 
at the bigger picture, uniformity is an asset, and the ‘15-24’ definition of the young is both 
reasonable and useful, above-all, for comparisons across time and countries.  
  A word also about the countries under scrutiny here. What constitutes a ‘developing’ 
or a ‘transition’ country will vary with time and circumstance. On the other hand, as noted 
above, uniformity and stability in categories is useful for data analysis particularly of the type 
undertaken here across countries and time. This can lead to oddities. In the paper, data on 
OECD countries are employed to examine specific questions for a subset of ‘transition’ and 
‘developing’ countries. Yet, ‘OECD’ is often used as a synonym for ‘industrialised’ in 
describing countries. Moreover, the category ‘transition country’ is qualitatively different 
from ‘industrialised’ and ‘developing’ which are, conceptually at least, mutually exclusive. 
For the purposes of the analysis of labour markets, the ‘Transition’ countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe have at least as much in common with their ‘Industrialised’ neighbours in 
Western Europe as they do with China.  
  Having introduced these caveats, in what follows I apply in standard fashion, and 
without further consideration, the age and country classification commonly employed by data 
collection agencies and analysts.   3
2. LONG-RUN TRENDS 
2.1. Population and Labour force 
  Let us take a look at some of the longer-run trends affecting youth labour markets all 
over the world. An obvious starting point is the growth in youth populations. Not 
infrequently, rapidly growing youth populations are seen as a cause for concern
1. Figure 1
2 
illustrates the growth in youth populations for the major regions on the world over the period 
1950-2010. Evidently the youth population has been and continues to grow rapidly. This is 
particularly the case in Asia where, by 2000, young people in that region constituted over 
61% of the world’s young people. Although of less significance numerically, the fastest 
growing young populations are to be found in Africa
3.   
  However, a number of observations are in order. First, the proportion of young people 
in the total population has actually been falling in Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, 
North America and Oceania since 1980, and in Asia since 1990. Only in Africa is the 
proportion expected to continue to grow into the new century (figure 2). 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Jones (1997) on Asia..  
2 Data Sources for the figures and table reported in this paper are given in an appendix.  
3 Indeed, The proportion of Asians in the World youth population has actually fallen from a little over 64% in 
1990.    4
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Second, if one considers the labour force, the trend is even more uniform. Even in 
Africa, the youth labour force is expected to fall as a percentage of the total labour force 
between 2000 and 2010.  This reflects falling labour force participation rates amongst young 
people. In as much as this is the result of increased participation in education as opposed to 
higher levels of discouraged young workers, this in itself is a positive trend to which I will 
return later. 
  Third, in recent years some questions have been asked concerning the effects of 
demographic changes using more rigorous analyses. The latest emergence of the debate can 
be dated to Korenman and Neumark’s 1997 paper on the effects of the youth share of the 
population on youth unemployment rates
4. Looking at OECD countries, they found an 
elasticity of youth unemployment to the youth share in total population of around 0.5. This is 
significantly lower than the elasticity found with respect to the adult unemployment rate of 
0.7. This suggests that aggregate economic conditions determining both youth and adult 
unemployment are more important  than demographic changes. Furthermore, O’Higgins 
(2001, chapter 3, Table 3.1) has estimated a similar specification to Korenman & Neumark’s, 
the principal difference being that the effects for young adults (20-24) and teenagers (15-19) 
are estimated separately. The results for teenagers are qualitatively similar to those found by 
Korenman & Neumark, however, for young adults the effects of  adult unemployment 
completely dominate the effects of the youth population share which is not statistically 
significant. A slightly different approach is taken by Shimer (1999). In this paper, the author 
concentrates on the effect of the share of youth population on the unemployment and labour 
force participation rates of different age groups leaving out of the equation (literally) the 
effects of the adult unemployment rate on young people. The analysis considers state level 
data for the USA over nearly thirty years. He finds that a higher youth population share 
actually  reduces the unemployment rate and raises the labour force participation rate of 
young people. This apparently surprising result is supported by the plausible reasoning that  
                                                 
4 Korenman & Neumark (1997). Of course the debate is much older, particularly in the United states where 
papers through from the 1970s to the early 1990s predicted and confirmed a negative effect of the US Baby 
Boom on unemployment rates. See, for example, Flaim (1979 & 1990) and Gordon (1992).    8
labour markets with more young people tend to be more flexible and in such a context there 
are more incentives for employers to create employment. These issues are returned to below, 
however, it is interesting to note at this stage that the rather automatic assumption that having 
more young people around creates additional pressures on the labour market forced to 
accommodate them may be misleading.        
2.2 Education 
  It is widely held that raising the educational level of young people (as indeed for 
older people) is likely to raise employment at both individual and aggregate levels. Again, 
this is returned to in a little more detail below. However, looking at the longer-run trends, it 
is encouraging to note that, almost universally, educational levels are on a very definite 
upward trend at least as regards broad regional aggregates. Figure 4 illustrates this trend. The 
figure reports the estimated and projected illiteracy rates of young people (15-24) between 
1970 and 2015 which I take here as a proxy for more general trends in educational levels. 
Encouraging is the fact that illiteracy rates have fallen off sharply since 1970. Also 
encouraging, albeit not very surprising given the starting point, is that the reduction is 
slightly more marked in Africa and Asia where, by 2015, illiteracy rates are expected to have 
fallen to one third of their 1970 levels.  
  On the other hand, these figures hide a significant distinction between young men and 
young women. Figure 5 reports the ratio of illiteracy rates of young women to that of young 
men over the period. Whilst, in America, Oceania and above all Europe, the gap between 
young women and young men appears to be narrowing, in Asia and Africa the tendency is 
towards a wider gap with a slight tendency in the projections to fall between 2005 or 2010 
and 2015. Moreover, in Europe, where the gap was most marked in 1970, the strong 
downward tendency observable is only sufficient to bring this region in line with Africa by 
2015. Finally, one might observe that only in America are illiteracy rates anywhere near the 
one-to-one level as regards young men and young women. 
  Returning to the bright side, in recent years interest has developed in looking at 
inequality in the education. One recent paper by Thomas, Wang & Fan (2000), suggests that    9
greater equality in education is associated with greater educational participation. Although 
the paper makes no claim to establish a causative relationship between the two, the 
uniformity of the relationship, in the presence of widely increasing educational levels is 
certainly a positive finding
5. 
 
                                                 
5 I have some doubts, however, as to the appropriateness of the Gini coefficient in this context and wonder 
whether an Atkinson type index of inequality, or possibly a generalised Gini  might not be more illuminative. 
Essentially the question concerns the relative weights attributed to different levels of variable of interest, in this 
case educational participation. For education, since a substantial proportion of the population do not participate, 
the Gini is essentially determined at the bottom end of the distribution. Certainly there is room for further 
analysis of this question.   10 
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2.3 Labour Force Participation 
Falls in the youth share in the labour force were above attributed in part to falling 
rates of labour force participation on the part of young people. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate this 
phenomenon separately for teenagers and young adults. The distinction between these two 
groups is particularly relevant here in as much as that whilst the teenage figures are 
principally determined by levels of educational participation, for young adults two important 
factors are at work. Participation in education is one, however at this age, this mainly means 
participation in tertiary education; the preserve of a minority even in industrialised countries. 
The second factor concerns participation in the labour force as opposed to undertaking other 
non-educational activities.  For adults, or indeed for the labour force as a whole, increasing 
levels of the employment population ratio (as opposed to the unemployment rate), are 
increasingly used as an indicator of the health of a country’s labour market. That is, the 
employment-population ratio may be seen as an indicator of a country’s ability to create jobs 
(ILO, 2002/2003)
6. Thus, whilst falling labour force participation amongst teenagers is likely 
to mainly reflect increased educational participation and is therefore unequivocally a ‘good’ 
sign, for young adults, the ‘good’ side of lowering labour force participation is tempered by 
the bad side reflecting, as it may, a failure on the part of countries to create sufficient jobs.  
  In any event, figure 6 shows that the long-run picture for young people is essentially 
positive with labour force participation rates falling more or less uniformly throughout the 
world
7. The picture for young adults reported in figure 7 on young adults reflects the 
presence of the two opposing forces mentioned above. Overall, in Europe, North America 
Oceania a moderately downward trend is observable, at least since 1980 (and in Asia since 
1990) suggesting the dominance of the ‘educational’ effect. In Africa, the picture is reversed 
with sharply rising labour force participation rates since 1970 albeit from a relatively low 
starting point. In as much as this reflects the dominance of a ‘good’ jobs effect, again here 
the trend is positive. 
                                                 
6 Indeed, in EU countries, the labour market targets established at the Lisbon Summit concern employment-
population ratios as opposed to unemployment rates. 
7 One curiosity here is the increased labour force participation rate amongst the baby boom generation in North 
America reflected in the increase in labour force participation of teenagers in that region between 1970 and 
1980.   13 
  As before, additional insight may be gained by looking at this information 
distinguishing between the  sexes. Figures 8 and 9 reports the ratio of the labour force 
participation rates of young women to that of young men for teenagers and young adults 
respectively. In as much as there is a clear tendency towards convergence of the labour force 
participation rates of young men and young women some encouragement may be drawn.     14 
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2.4 Child labour 
  These days, child labour and its abolition occupy central stage amongst the stated 
concerns of Governments in developing countries. Children working rather than going to 
school are quite clearly going to have fewer chances on the labour market. Although formal 
evidence on this question is a little scarce, partly because of the lack of long-run panel data in 
developing countries, I believe such a view is neither controversial nor controvertible. 
Although traditional to separate entirely questions of ‘child labour’ from those concerning 
‘youth employment’, accepting the reasoning above, there is little justification for doing so, if 
one wishes to understand the labour market for young people
8.  
  Figure 10 illustrates the positive downward trend in child labour, here approximated 
by the labour force participation rates of children aged 10-14. In 1950, more than one in three 
children aged 10-14 were working in Africa and Asia and one in four in the world as a 
whole. By 2010, child labour is expected to fall to the extent that ‘only’ around one in five 
children (10-14) will be working in Africa and around one in twenty in Asia and Latin 
America so that in the in the World as a whole child labour will involve just one in ten 
children. A major improvement certainly but much remains to be done. The widespread 
existence of child labour is likely to continue to condition the experience of many young 
people in developing countries at least for some time to come. 
  The long-run trends illustrated above however are reliant on rather rough and ready 
proxy for child labour
9. Recently, the ILO has made a serious attempt to quantify the extent 
of different forms of child labour in a more precise manner (ILO, 2002a). Being the second  
                                                 
8 Even more so when one starts to look at Decent Work, as opposed to employment per se. 
9 And the fact that data are collected for a different purpose. Of note is the fact that, according to the Labour 
force based figures, child labour has not existed in North America since 1980 and in Europe since 1990. This 
contrasts with the ILO child labour estimates for 2000, which suggest that 2% of (or one in fifty) children are 
working in developed countries. Kruse & Mahoney (1998) estimate that in the USA, 148,000 (or 0,5% of) 
minors were employed illegally in an average week and 290,000 at sometime during the year.   19 
exercise of this type, the first having been undertaken in 1995
10, there is evidence to support 
the view that child labour is on a downward trend, at  least between 1995 and 2000
11. 
According to these estimates, the number of economically active children (5-14) fell from 
around 250 million to a little over 210 million. These figures imply that whilst in 1995, one 
in four children aged between 5 and 14 was working, by 2000 the corresponding figure was 
between one in five and one in six, with, it may be added, no significant difference between 




                                                 
10 ILO (1996). 
11 As the report points out, however, the estimates are not directly comparable in as much as: a) the 2000 data 
are based on a much larger sample and therefore different extrapolation methods were used; and, b) the quality 
of the information collected at country level has improved markedly in both scope and depth in the intervening 
period.    20 
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2.5 Conclusions 
  The above broad brush analysis of long-run trends presents an essentially positive 
picture of developments youth labour markets.  
Amongst the encouraging signs one may note that:  
•  Whilst youth populations are undoubtedly growing in absolute terms, the proportion 
of young people as a percentage of the total population is on a decidedly downward 
trend. 
•  If one extends the picture to economically active young people as a percentage of the 
total labour force, the downward trend is reinforced due to increases in the 
educational participation of young people. Here, even in Africa, the trend is 
downward. 
•  There is a universal and fairly uniform tendency towards increasing literacy rates 
amongst young people throughout the world 
•  There is a general movement towards the convergence of male/female differences in 
labour force participation rates 
•  Child labour appears everywhere to be on the decline. 
On the other hand, at least one less positive trend is observable even from this very 
general overview. Specifically: 
•  The gap between male and female literacy rates in Asia and Africa and, consequently, 
the world appear to be widening. 
3. WHICH, WHOM AND WHY? LABOUR MARKET OUTCOMES AND THEIR 
    DETERMINANTS 
3.1 Which Outcomes? 
  Although apparently obvious, it is worth considering a moment which are, or indeed 
should be, the outcomes of interest. Technical analyses of the effect of individual  and 
aggregate factors determining labour market ‘outcomes’ tend to concentrate on either the 
determinants of unemployment (a ‘bad’ outcome) or employment (a ‘good’ outcome). Rather 
less attention is paid to young people’s wages as an outcome. Although higher wages as an 
indicator of job quality might reasonably be an outcome to aim for, their position is   22 
somewhat complicated by their more usual role as villain in creating high levels of 
unemployment. Attention in this sphere has tended to concentrate on the role of high 
minimum wages as a factor in impeding the employment of young people or alternatively the 
positive role to be played by sub-minimum wages for young people. A further complicating 
factor is that wage data by age are less widely available, or at least published. In any event, 
there is a discussion of the findings of studies on wages and minimum wages in particular 
below.  
3.1.1 Labour Force Participation 
  As suggested above, although for the population as a whole, the labour force 
participation rate, or certainly the employment-population ratio, is a sensible target variable 
to seek to raise, for young people the question is complicated by the role of education. Since 
education can generally be seen as playing a useful function in improving the l evel and 
quality of employment at both individual and macro- levels, participation in education by 
young people necessarily lowers their labour force participation rates. In O’Higgins (2001), I 
argued that a more useful indicator than the youth unemployment rate is the youth non-
employment rate defined on the basis of a widened definition of the labour force adding to 
both nominator and denominator young people who are neither in education or 
employment
12. In the 1990s, such an indicator began to be introduced in analyses of the 
youth labour market by the OECD
13. Analyses of the question need at least to take into 
account this aspect. 
                                                 
12 See also Ryan (2003) for an illuminating  discussion of the usefulness of youth unemployment as an indicator 
of labour market problems for young people based on a comparison between France and the USA.  
13 See, for example, OECD (1999, chapter one). An alternative way of thinking of the index is by looking at its 
counterpart which is essentially the employment population ratio for young people adjusted for educational 
participation. Specifically  the non-employment rate may be defined as: 
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3.1.2 Long-Term Unemployment  
  There is an argument to be made that long-term unemployment is a more important 
negative indicator than unemployment per se. Certainly there is evidence to suggest that the 
negative consequences of unemployment are largely associated with lengthy spells of 
unemployment rather than unemployment per se (O’Higgins, 2001). This is indeed 
recognised on the policy choices of governments which increasingly concentrate on the 
problem of the long-term unemployed. 
3.1.3 Informal Sector Employment 
  Another issue regards the quality of employment; specifically, the informal sector. 
Simply stated, informal sector employment refers to unregistered employment. However, 
there are many problems in actually defining and even more, identifying, participants in the 
informal sector
14. Awareness has been growing in recent years of the importance of the 
sector and both the ILO and the OECD now produce aggregate estimates of participation in 
the informal economy. Although estimates, based on a variety of methodologies, now exist 
for a wide number of countries
15, information on the involvement of young people in the 
sector has not yet been compiled for a wide range of countries. Both theoretical reasoning 
and such empirical evidence as does exist
16, would suggest that young people are 
disproportionately represented in the informal sector. The question is important and, despite 
the lack of adequate data, some discussion is included below.  
3.1.4 Underemployment 
Another important, albeit rather neglected area concerns underemployment. 
Difficulties of concept and measurement are even more pronounced for underemployment 
than they are for involvement in the informal sector
17. Although information is collected on a 
                                                                                                                                                       
I take the opportunity of mentioning here that the untimely demise of Norman Bowers who was largely 
responsible for this and other innovations in the OECD’s analyses of labour market questions is a great loss to 
all of us interested in such questions.   
14 For rather more satisfactory albeit not universally applied conceptual and operational definitions the 
interested reader is refereed to ILO (1993).  
15 See, for, example, ILO (2002b) and Schneider (2002). 
16 See, for one example, O’Higgins et al. (2001) for brief consideration of the question in Bulgaria. 
17 For a formal definition of underemployment see ILO (1998)   24 
rather ad hoc basis, such evidence as exists suggests that here again, young people are likely 
to be disproportionately represented also in this type of employment.   
3.1.5 Unemployment Rates 
  In the end, however, and at least for the present, one is brought back to the youth 
unemployment rate as the principal indicator of the labour market problems of young people. 
It is widely available, its definition is clear and is becoming m ore and more uniformly 
applied in reported statistics by national agencies also in developing and transition countries. 
In what follows then, I concentrate on trends in and, above-all, the determinants of, 
unemployment, with some consideration also for labour force participation, recognising 
however that these are by no means the only or indeed the best possible indicators of labour 
market performance.   
3.2 Whose Outcome? 
  A very important question in all this regards whose outcome is (or should be) of 
interest?  Whilst it is fairly natural to concentrate first on aggregate indicators, the youth 
unemployment rate and so on, there is much to be said for a finer concentration on specific 
individual characteristics which influence labour market outcomes. Perhaps foremost 
amongst these are gender, ethnicity and disability. The relative lack of data on some 
indicators of labour market disadvantage have meant that it is often harder to quantify and 
moreover compare disadvantage across countries, particularly in the less developed regions. 
For example, unemployment rates by ethnic minority are often not reported. Indeed, in the 
transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the reporting of labour market status by 
ethnicity is often explicitly forbidden by law
18. Notwithstanding this, it is increasingly argued 
that attention should be concentrated on ‘disadvantaged’ groups of young people rather than 
young people per se
19.  
                                                 
18 The formal justification for this regards fears that such information might be used to further promote 
discrimination against, in particular, the most disadvantaged group in this region, the Roma. The question, 
however, is a little complicated. The interested reader is referred to the recent report produced by UNDP in 
collaboration with the ILO on the Roma in five countries of Central and Eastern Europe (UNDP, 2002). The 
report is the first attempt to systematically  collect and analyse comparable and comprehensive information on 
the socioeconomic situation of the Roma in CEE.  
19 See, inter alia,  O’Higgins (2001) and Godfrey (2003).   25 
  Undoubtedly some young people are more likely than others to become and to remain 
unemployed.  More generally, some types of young person tend to face greater difficulties 
than others in obtaining Decent Work
20.  Although not so apparent from an examination of 
unemployment rates per se, I think it uncontroversial to suggest that young women continue 
to face greater difficulties than young men in their search for good quality employment. In 
order to consider this question adequately however, one must go beyond unemployment rates 
and look more explicitly at the educational participation of young women as well as their 
participation in informal employment and underemployment. 
  Ethnicity is also a common source of disadvantage on the labour market for the young 
as for older people. As noted above however, the relative lack of data make a comprehensive 
picture difficult to establish. A similar position may be taken with regard to disability. In 
both cases however, data are improving, as indeed they are in regard to the documentation of 
the informal sector and underemployment.  
3.3 Recent Trends in Outcomes 
3.3.1 Youth unemployment 
  Figure 11 provides information on youth and prime age adult (25-54) unemployment 
rates for the most recent year available taken from the ILO’s KILM database (ILO, 
2002/2003). Without looking at countries in detail the figure demonstrates the well-known 
relation between youth and adult unemployment rates. That is, with the notable but unique 
exception of South Africa, youth rates are much higher than for their older colleagues. 
Specifically, for the countries reported here (and with the exception of South Africa), the 
youth unemployment rate is between two and eight times the adult rate. This is not a new 
observation
21. It is worth noting however that, although qualitatively similar, the ratio tends 
to be higher in developing countries than for industrialised ones. One possible explanation 
for this is the absence of an adequate social security safety net in the former. In such a 
                                                 
20 I use the term here in the sense that it has recently been introduced into the literature originating from the 
ILO. That is, Decent Work involves essentially productive, secure and rewarding work and a s such is proposed 
as a ‘better’ target than employment per se. It is characterized by the presence of better working conditions and 
excludes most irregular and unregulated forms of employment such as to be found, for example, in the informal 
sector. 
21 See, for example, O’Higgins (1997), and practically all subsequent ILO publications on youth 
(un)employment.   26 
situation, families are more likely to enter as providers of last resort for young people than 
for adults. The fact that families may be too poor to do so obviously contributes to the oft-
noted phenomenon of educated unemployment in developing countries
22 whereby the 
(relatively well-educated) offspring  of higher income parents are the ones who can actually 
afford to remain unemployed.  
  Figure 12 plots the ratio of youth to adult unemployment rates for a range of 
transition and developing countries. With the exceptions of Egypt, Indonesia and Korea (and 
in the mid-1990s, Romania), the youth unemployment rate in the countries reported here has 
remained (more or less) in the range of two to four times the adult rate.   
 
                                                 
22 It is interesting to note, as well as being supportive of the family support hypothesis, that in Italy, which 
although an industrialized country, has no adequate social safety net for the unemployed, displays similar 
characteristics, namely a high ratio of youth to adult unemployment rates as well as a relatively high 
unemployment rate amongst graduates.   27 
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3.3.2 Long-term Unemployment 
  There is a growing literature concerning the damage caused by long-run 
unemployment to individuals’ human c apital and, consequently, to societies’ economic 
potential. The underlying belief is that the negative consequences of unemployment are 
largely related to protracted (and/or repeated) periods of unemployment rather than the 
incidence of unemployment per se. This type of argument has been used in the past to 
suggest that the unemployment of young people is relatively innocuous. Young people tend 
to have a high incidence of unemployment – a more or less natural consequence of shopping 
around on the labour market to find appropriate work – but a lower average duration of 
unemployment than older people; a young person is fairly likely to experience 
unemployment but it probably won’t last very long. 
  A number of issues and clarifications are required here. First, I have argued 
elsewhere
23  as indeed have others
24 that the duration of unemployment for young people is 
by no means uniformly shorter than for older people at least as far as industrialised countries 
are concerned. Figure 13 reports evidence on the question for six countries which have the 
distinction of being OECD members (and are therefore in the OECD database) but are also 
still classified as being either developing (Korea and Mexico) or transition (Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) countries in other contexts
25. 
For the countries shown here, young people invariably have are lower incidence of 
long-term unemployment (here defined as an uncompleted unemployment duration of at least 
six months) than adults. However, the difference is small. Much  more substantial are 
differences in the incidence of long-term unemployment between countries with and without 
an effective social safety net. O’Higgins (2002) reports evidence also for Sri Lanka which 
shows that in that country, young adults (20-24) actually had a higher incidence of long-term 
unemployment than prime age adults (over 25).  
A related point concerns the characteristics of young people which are likely to lead 
them to be unemployed for a long-time. Just as the incidence of unemployment is not random 
across young people nor is its duration. Some ‘types’ of young person are more likely than 
                                                 
23 O’Higgins (1997, 2001). 
24 See, for example, Ryan (2001). 
25 For example, in the KILM database used extensively in this paper.   30 
others to be observed as being unemployed. Typical examples concern young people 
belonging to ethnic minorities or those with disabilities and so on. That a person is more or 
less likely to be observed as being unemployed will depend on the probability of that person 
becoming unemployed as well as the likelihood of remaining in that state once there. More 
evidence is required on the relative importance of these two factors in determining higher 
























































   
3.3.3. Informal Sector Employment 
  Figure 14 reports survey based estimates of informal sector employment as a 
percentage of total employment for a selection of countries. There does not seem to be strong 
regularity to the pattern as regards women’s vs. men’s involvement in the informal sector. In 
ten of the nineteen countries the incidence of female involvement in the informal sector is 
greater than for males. Males predominate in Central and Eastern Europe and the reverse is 
true in Asia. Perhaps of more obvious importance is the huge size of the sector in many   31 
countries. In Nepal and Tanzania, almost nine out of every ten employed women works in 
the informal sector. In addition to being somewhat worrying of itself, rather obviously, it has 
important implications for the types of employment policies which are appropriate in such 
contexts.   32 
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  Figure 15 provides an overview of movements over time in informal sector 
employment. Worthy of note, in all the countries reported here the size of the informal sector 
appears to be on the increase
26. 
 








































































On the basis of the information presented here one can, however, say nothing about 
the involvement of young people in the informal sector. A little basic reasoning may throw 
some light on the question. First, Child Labour takes place, by definition, exclusively in the 
informal sector. In as much as there is state dependence in child/youth labour market 
experiences (see below), one would expect a substantial proportion of young people also to 
be involved in the informal sector. Also, the nature of employment relations in the informal 
sector, flexible and exploitative, implies a relatively high turnover of the workforce. In as 
                                                 
26 I hasten to add that this is, as far as one can judge, a general pattern. There are many data problems with 
comparisons both across time and space, however, I can assure the reader that increased employment in the 
informal sector was not one of the criteria for inclusion in the figure.   34 
much as young people are disproportionately represented amongst job seekers (O’Higgins, 
2001), one would expect a correspondingly high proportion of young people amongst 
informal sector workers. More systematic examination of this question is clearly in order, 
however, one might add finally that casual observation of this author (as I would imagine for 
the readers) in transition and above-all developing countries, certainly does not contradict the 
idea of heavy involvement of young people in the sector.        
3.4 Determinants of Outcomes  
3.4.1 Youth unemployment and Labour Force participation – The Role of  Demographics  
   and Aggregate Demand 
  In recent years, the role of the size of the youth cohort in determining youth 
unemployment has been the subject of some concern and, in industrialised countries at least, 
analysis. Some work has also considered the importance of aggregate demand factors relative 
to demography. Table 1 presents results of a set of panel regressions (with fixed country 
effects and AR(1) correction) intended to look at this question for a selection of developing 
and transition countries
27. The dependent variables looked at are (the natural logs of) youth 
unemployment rates, labour force participation rates and the ratio of youth to adult 
unemployment rates. 
  The table allows some comparison with previous results reported for OECD 
countries. The first set of results concerning the determination of the youth unemployment 
rate shows that both adult unemployment (representing aggregate demand factors) and the 
share of young people in the working age population both have positive and significant 
influences on youth unemployment rates. The results are qualitatively similar to those 
reported by Korenman & Neumark (1997) and O’Higgins (2001) on OECD countries and 
diverge from those reported by Shimer (1999) who, as noted above, finds a negative effect of 
youth population share on youth unemployment for the USA. The estimated elasticity of 
youth unemployment with respect to the population share is of the order of 0.6 (slightly 
                                                 
27 The selection of countries depended essentially on the presence of time-series data in the ILO’s KILM 
database. Although comparability across time and countries is still a major issue in this dataset, much efforts 
have been expended by the KILM staff in making the information presented compatible and comparable in 
terms of definitions used and so on. In order to be included in the dataset for estimation purposes, in addition to 
being present in the KILM dataset, the criterion of having information on all relevant variables for at least three 
consecutive periods was applied. The data are of course of annual.    35 
larger for young women than for young men) without the inclusion of adult unemployment. 
The addition of the latter reduces the estimated elasticity with respect to the population share 
by around 0.2 but does not undermine its statistical significance. In this, the results differ 
from those reported by Korenman & Neumark who find no significant impact of the 
population share in the presence of the adult unemployment rate
28. Taken at face value
29, the 
results imply that the falling youth population shares to be found in most developing and 
transition countries are likely to ease the transition to employment of the upcoming 
generations of young people.  
  Let us turn to the labour force participation rates of young people. The estimated 
elasticities of labour force participation with respect to the youth share of the population are 
substantially higher than (roughly twice) those reported by Shimer (1999). One plausible 
explanation for this is that in less developed countries one would tend to find a higher youth 
population share due to higher birth and death rates as well as a higher labour force 
participation rate due to lower educational participation. That is to say, the relation estimated 
here is, in part, not a causal one, but rather dependent on the joint determination of youth 
population share and labour force participation. More analysis is clearly in order. Interesting 
to note here also is the lack of statistical significance of the adult unemployment rate in 
determining labour force participation adding further support to the idea of other factors 
being at work
30.    
  The final set of results reported concern the determination of the youth/adult 
differential. Analyses of this form have been undertaken by, inter alia, Bertola et al. (2002) 
and Jimeno & Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2002). The results essentially confirm (and indeed 
reflect) the first set concerning the determination of youth unemployment. An elasticity of 
youth unemployment with respect to adult unemployment of less than one implies that as 
adult unemployment rates increase, youth unemployment rates also increase but less than 
                                                 
28 Korenman & Neumark (1997) report a series of results. I use as the main base of comparison here, the closest 
estimation reported in the paper, namely table 2, model D. Their preferred IV estimates of the elasticity with 
respect to the youth population are of the order of 0.5, very similar to those presented here 
29 This, I hesitate to do at this stage. More examination and analysis of the data is required before I would be 
prepared to bet money on the specific point estimates, although I would defend the overall direction of the 
results reported here.  
30 The lack of statistical significance also adds informal weight to the non-use of an instrument for the youth 
population share in the estimation of the determinants of youth unemployment. If adult unemployment is 
uncorrelated with youth labour force participation, the need for an instrument disappears.     36 
proportionately leading to a lower youth adult ratio at higher levels of overall unemployment. 
One may also note the strong pressures on the youth labour market arising from greater youth 
shares in the population. 
Table 1: Panel Estimates of the Impact of Demographics and Aggregate  
Demand on Youth Labour Indicators (unsigned t-ratios in brackets) 
 
  Youth Population as a 





58 (7.1)  -   
Males & Females  .39 (6.5)  .59 (13.3) 
.57 (6.8)  -   
Males  .38 (6.1)  .57 (12.1) 





Rate   
Females  .44 (5.7)  .63 (10.8) 
.93 (21.2)  -   
Males & Females  .92 (20.8)  .02 (1.0) 
.94 (21.2)  -   
Males  .94 (20.9)  .02 (0.8) 




Youth Labour force 
Participation Rate   
Females  .89 (17.4)  .06 (1.6) 
.25 (3.1)  -   
Males & Females  .39 (6.5)  -.41 (9.3) 
.30 (4.0)  -   
Males  .43 (7.1)  -.41 (8.8) 
.18 (1.6)  - 
 
 
Ratio of Youth to 
Adult Unemployment 
Rates   
Females  .36 (3.9)  -.48 (7.9) 
Notes: Fixed country effects AR(1) model,  199 Observation (32 developing and transition countries ), 
1980-2000, unbalanced panel, all variables are in natural logarithms, whereas the dependent variables are 
defined specific to the relevant gender, the independent variables remain constant across regressions. 
 
3.4.2 Education and Unemployment 
  Figures 16a and 16b report unemployment rates by education for two developing and 
two transition countries. Whilst the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
display broadly similar patterns to industrialised countries, with unemployment rates falling 
with education, developing countries often display characteristics of the educated 
unemployment problem. This is reflected to some extent in the figure. I have argued 
elsewhere (O’Higgins, 2001) along with several others such as Manning & Junankar (1998) 
that identifying the problems of youth in developing countries with those of the educated   37 
unemployed youth is misleading. As noted above, countries lacking a system of 
unemployment and social security benefits will tend to alter the composition of the 
unemployed, biasing it towards those from relatively well-off families which can afford to 
support their children’s unemployment.  
This implies that the unemployment rate is perhaps less useful as an indicator of 
problems in the labour market rather than that the most vulnerable groups in developing 
countries are the more educated. There is certainly scope for more careful studies of this 
issue on a country by country basis looking at the determinants of employment using 
individual level data. It seems reasonable to suggest that such educated unemployment  is 
largely confined to wait unemployment amongst better-off young people. A thesis finding 
support from Rama (1999) for Sri Lanka, but which is also supported by the evidence on 
returns to education reported below. 
A further issue upon which the figures throw some light is a purely statistical one. 
Educational levels in developing countries have been rapidly increasing over the last half 
century or so. As a result, the average level of education is increasing with each cohort. This 
means that younger people on average have higher levels of education. They also, as a 
general rule, have higher unemployment rates. This implies that there will be a positive 
statistical correlation between unemployment rates of the population and educational level 
without implying any causative mechanism working between them. To look at youth 
unemployment rates by education is inappropriate in order to discern their effects since many 
young people undertaking higher levels of education will still be participating or will have 
recently completed their education so that one is not comparing like with like. Those with 
low levels have had much more time with which to integrate themselves into the labour 
market (O’Higgins, 2001). The use of OECD data, which reports unemployment rates by age 
and education, allows us to distinguish between the effects of age and education. Figure 16a 
reports the unemployment rates by education of 15-29 year olds. Comparing the 
unemployment rates for Korea in this figure with those from 16b (unemployment rates by 
education for all adults) one may observe that the essentially inverse relation between 
education  
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and unemployment in figure 16b is reversed in figure 16a. Above-all, one clearly observes 
that the most disadvantaged young people, in terms of  unemployment rates, are those with   39 
less than secondary education. Not, as would appear form figure 16b, those with tertiary 
(non-university) level education. 
In Central and Eastern Europe, it is worth noting that during the years of transition (or 
at least for the last decade or so during which time reliable data has been available) that the 
gap between unemployment rates of those with different levels of education has widened. In 
as much as such a widening of the gap reflects the introduction of market signals many 
would find this an encouraging sign. At the same time, however, there is also evidence that 
there has been growing inequality in access to basic education
31; a somewhat less 
encouraging sign. 
3.4.3 Education and Wages 
  Evidence on the returns to education to individuals is far more widespread than on the 
relationship between education and unemployment. Based on the seminal work of Mincer 
and subsequently Becker, since the 1970s, returns to education estimates have been available 
for a range of countries. George Psacharopoulos really got the ball rolling with his cross 
country comparison in 1973 (Psacharopoulos, 1973) and has been providing updates every 
ten years or so since culminating in his most recent contribution last year (Psacharopoulos & 
Patrinos, 2002). The latest results essentially confirm the findings of previous work. That is, 
(above-all private) rates of return to education are substantially higher in developing 
countries than in the OECD. The highest returns to all levels of education (including tertiary 
level) are to be found in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, also in Asia and Latin America, the 
rates of return to education are well above those found in the OECD. 
  In any event, all the evidence strongly stands against the notion of an impoverished 
and disadvantaged group of educated young people in developing countries. 
  Estimates of rates of return to education are, for obvious reasons, of more recent 
vintage in countries of Central and Eastern Europe and here the pattern is a little different. 
For the most part, these studies have found that rates of return to education have been 
increasing during the first half of the 1990s although they remain well below the levels of 
return to be found in comparable middle-income countries (Newell & Reilly, 1999). Again, 
                                                 
31 See, for example, UNICEF (2000).   40 
this growing inequality in the wages of those with different levels of education indicating as 
it does, growing benefits to educational participation is to some extent a reflection of the 
introduction of market signals
32 and therefore would be considered by many as a positive 
development.  
  One or two recent studies have however started to modify and refine this overall 
view. Campos & Joliffe (2002) looking at the returns to education in Hungary from 1986 to 
1998, find that although returns have been growing over the period, the main period of 
change was in very early transition, between 1986 and 1992
33 and that since 1992, returns to 
an additional year of education have been above 10% which is in line with other middle 
income countries and well above those found in Western Europe. Somewhat similar results 
have been found also in Belarus (Pastore & Vershchagina, 2002) On the other hand, recent 
evidence for Russia (Cheidvasser & Benitez-Silva, 2000) suggests that rates of return in that 
substantial country remain lower than the average for transition economies and, moreover, 
have not increased to any significant extent since 1992. In the largest transition country of 
them all, China, recent estimates (Li, 2003) suggest that there too economic  reforms 
increased the returns to education, with the main increase occurring in transition (1980-87) 
with relatively little variation in rates of return in the subsequent period examined (1988-95).  
At the Macro level, evidence also supports substantial benefits to rising levels of 
education as a whole. Here the main debate concerns whether the stock of human capital (or 
education) affects the level of income in an economy or its growth rate. Taken as a whole, 
however, studies provide strong support for the view that raising the level of human capital in 
an economy raises its productivity and therefore the earnings potential of an economy 
(Sianesi & Reenen, 2002). 
 
                                                 
32 Indeed, Newell (2001) finds that growing wage inequality in Poland at least is attributable to rising 
participation in post-compulsory education and earlier retirement as opposed to changes in hourly wage 
inequality.   
33  These results confirm and extend those reported by the Kertesi & Kollo (1999) looking at period upto 1996 
in Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland.    41 
3.4.4 Wages and Employment 
  Here the debate in recent times has centred on the effects of minimum wages on 
employment in general and youth employment in particular. O’Higgins (2001) reports small 
or zero employment effects of minimum wages. However, this was largely based on evidence 
from OECD countries. There is some relatively recent evidence to support a negative impact 
on employment on minimum wages in some developing countries at least. Worthy of note in 
this regard are the papers by Maloney & Nunez (2000?) and Arya (2002). Both of these find 
small but significant negative effects of minimum wages on employment. Maloney & Nunez 
find an aggregate elasticity of employment with respect to the minimum wage of .15, whilst 
Arya finds an even smaller albeit statistically significant negative effect of minimum wages 
on teenage employment (but not on the employment of young adults) in Thailand. On the 
whole there appears to be no reason to significantly revise the earlier view expressed in 
O’Higgins (2001).  
  In general, because of the existence of large informal sectors as well as more general 
difficulties in enforcing compliance with minimum wage regulations, the issue of the impact 
of minimum wages has been seen as less relevant in developing countries. However, one 
very interesting finding of the Maloney & Nunez paper is that, for a range of Latin American 
countries at least, the minimum wage seems to affect wage determination not just in the 
formal sector but also in the informal sector. This is indeed an important finding which needs 
further investigation.   
3.4.5 State Dependence 
  “What we do here today, echoes in all eternity.”
34 Perhaps, perhaps not. Certainly, 
however, what we do today has an important impact on what we will be able to do tomorrow. 
Put in another way the labour market outcome(s) experienced by an individual today is (are) 
likely to have an important influence on the labour market outcome(s) of that same individual 
tomorrow. The consequence or outcome becomes, at least partially, the cause. In the context 
of young people, perhaps two types of ‘state dependence’ are of particular importance. First, 
                                                 
34 Russell Crowe as Maximus in the film, Gladiator, 2000, Columbia-Tristar.   42 
Child labour. More or less everybody agrees it is a bad thing
35. It seems generally agreed that 
it is likely to damage young people, impeding the acquisition of human capital and causing 
physiological and psychological damage. However, actual evidence supporting these 
assumptions is, to say the least, rather patchy. As the ILO’s report (ILO, 2002d) notes, more 
needs to be known about the medical consequences of children working. In the context of the 
labour market problems of young people, more also needs to be known also on the long-term 
consequences on the labour market experiences of young people arising from their 
involvement in child labour. As yet, whilst much is believed, little evidence has been 
analysed. Now that evidence is being more systematically collected on child labour, it would 
perhaps be an appropriate moment to start looking more seriously at the question of the links 
between child and (young) adult labour market experiences. 
  The second kind of ‘state dependence’ question concerns the persistence of 
unemployment. More precisely, the question arises as to whether the fact of being 
unemployed today makes one more likely to be unemployed tomorrow. Moreover, for policy 
purposes, it is also desirable to understand whether state dependence is greater for young 
people than for adults. In industrialised countries this question has started to receive some 
attention. In several European countries state dependence effects have been found for young 
people
36. Moreover, such scarring effects have been found to last for at least seven years in 
France and upto seventeen in the UK.
37. In contrast, little evidence of state dependence has 
been found in the USA (Ryan, 2001).  
                                                 
35 I refer here, of course, to Child labour as defined by the ILO, rather than working children per se. The ILO 
definition explicitly concerns forms of work undertaken by young people upto the age of eighteen which should 
be eliminated. Acceptable forms of infantile employment essentially concern ‘light work’ from the age of 
twelve and ‘non-hazardous work’ from the age of fifteen or thereabouts. For further details see ILO (2002d).  
36 See the excellent discussion of this and other issues in Ryan (2001) and the papers cited therein. I do however 
find myself splitting hairs with one aspect of his analysis. Ryan states that current policies targeted at long-term 
young unemployed are predicated on three assumptions, one of which is that  that state dependence is stronger 
for youths than for adults. I beg to differ. Even if state dependence were of the same order for youths and adults 
there is clear economic argument in favour of concentrating o the former. Specifically, young people are 
younger than adults and consequently state dependence effects will, on average, last longer. That is, the same 
negative state dependence effects leading to an equal permanent lowering of income and productivity will be 
quantatively larger for young people since, on average, they will last longer. 
37 See Allaire et al. (1995) on France and Gregg (2001) on the UK.   43 
3.5 Conclusions  
  Much of this section has been concerned with what we believe but as yet have little 
hard evidence to support. Further research is clearly needed in a range of areas, of which 
more below. Amongst the evidence based findings reported here the following are perhaps 
worth highlighting: 
•  Youth unemployment in developing and transition countries appears to be strongly 
influenced by both demographic factors and aggregate labour market conditions. In as 
much as young people’s share in the working age population is on a downward trend 
in most countries, this is an encouraging finding suggesting that falling youth 
population shares may lead to an easing of difficulties in the transition to good quality 
employment.  
•  The relatively small differences between the duration of unemployment for youths 
and adults found here, suggest that attention needs to be paid to the long-run 
unemployment of young people. More generally more attention to disadvantaged 
groups amongst the young is in order 
•  Results on returns to education, the effects of education on unemployment and the 
discussion of ‘which outcomes’ taken together cast further doubts, if such were 
necessary, on the ‘educated unemployment’ hypothesis. There is no objective basis 
for an exclusive concentration on the problems of educated unemployed. 
•  Evidence from industrialised countries suggests that state dependence in 
unemployment is an important problem. More information and analysis is needed for 
transition and developing countries on this question as well as on the links between 
child labour and the labour market experiences of young people.   44 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
4.1 Policy Implications 
•  Long-run evidence suggests that, whilst many improvements have been registered, 
greater efforts are required in combating the educational disadvantage of young 
women. Since education is a strong determinant of ‘success’ on the labour market, 
wide, often widening gaps in the levels of education of young women and young men 
remain a major cause for concern 
•  Youth Employment Policy needs to focus greater attention on disadvantaged groups 
in the labour market. A first step in this requires objective identification of which 
groups have greatest problems in obtaining and maintaining good quality 
employment. In developing countries, it is time to discard the ‘educated unemployed’ 
hypothesis, popular for s o long for fairly obvious but not objective reasons, and 
concentrate on groups really requiring attention. 
•  Evidence accumulated on wages and employment does not provide strong support for 
the hypothesis that minimum wages are damaging to the employment prospects of 
young people. However, recent work has suggested that they may be more relevant in 
developing countries than previously believed. Specifically, such evidence as exists 
suggests that the detrimental employment effects of minimum wages may greater in 
at least some developing countries than in the industrialised world. Further, evidence 
from Latin America suggests that minimum wages may affect wage setting in both 
formal and informal sectors. If true at a general level, this has important implications 
for wage policy in developing countries.  
4.2 Research implications 
  It is evident from the analysis presented here that many gaps remain in out 
knowledge. Amongst possible topics for further research, I would emphasise the following: 
•  Links between child labour and later youth labour market experiences 
•  The extent and nature of the involvement of young people in the informal sector and 
in underemployment 
•  State dependence in youth labour market experiences    45 
•  The extent and nature of youth labour market problems amongst different types of 
young person  
•  To what extent are youth and adult labour markets separate entities? This is an 
important, and rather neglected, issue. Understanding (potential or actual) substitution 
and complementarity between workers of different ages can be a useful support to 
designing policies which do not involve (unintentional) large-scale substitution 
between workers of different ages 
•  The role of minimum wages on wage setting in both formal and informal sectors in 
developing and transition countries. 
4.3 Data Implications 
  Data collection, compilation and dissemination has improved enormously in recent 
years. This is due largely to the efforts of national and international agencies, or rather, to the 
efforts of the people who work for them. They are to be congratulated. It is to be hoped, 
however, that further improvements may follow. In terms of the analyses presented here two 
very obvious ways in which the available information might be improved are: 
•  The dissemination of data on labour market status (including unemployment duration) 
disaggregated by age and a variety of other relevant characteristics. In general such 
data is collected, however, it is often not (easily) available 
•  Collection of longitudinal information on the labour market experiences of children 
and young people. Amongst other things, this would help throw light on ‘state 
dependence’ crucial for the design of appropriate preventative as well as remedial 
youth employment policies 
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